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New Religiosity, Posmodern Age  
and Post-Materialistic Values
Abstract  
This paper examines one of the most significant structural 
changes brought about by post-modern age compared with 
classical modernism. This structural change can be identified 
in the eruption of so-called post materialistic values that are 
evident in the very core ideology of post-modernity; the need 
for belonging and identity. What results is the creation of new 
post-modern identities as combinations of traditional forms 
of identities and emerging forms which were being 
discovered at the time. The eruption of post materialistic 
values is witnessed also by the accord between civil 
(democratic) society and conventional religions after World 
War II, which gives a new post-modern identity to the epoch. 
Apart from social movements, research results of so-called 
positive, or natural sciences, contributed greatly to the 
promotion of post materialistic values. This new, concrete 
reality of science in practice is manifested in two new modern 
paradigms- general relativity and quantum mechanics. This 
paper will finally reach the conclusion that the era of new 
post-modern «enchantment» is reflected in the phenomenon 
of post materialistic values and is opposite to Weber’s 
modernistic «un enchantment» (Entzauberung) of reality.
Keywords: postmodern age, post-materialistic values, 
identity, new devotion, new scientific paradigms, the time of 
new enchantment  
  We are living at a time when religion has made a great come-
back in the lives of ordinary people and in the basic flows of social 
and political life of societies all over the world, thus constituting an 
inevitable social power of our time.  One hundred or two hundred 
years ago it seemed that forces of enlightening social emancipa-
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tion would consign religion to the antiques cabinet together with 
other social phenomena obsoleted by the modern era.
However, religion proved itself as a resilient social phenome-
non which survived all attempts of “emancipation” and “modernisa-
tion”. Therefore, from the perspective of the first decades of the 
twentieth century, we could say a paradox occurred when religion 
replaced   modernity and not vice versa, as was expected by 
“prophets of the new age”, from the French Enlighteners to 
Nietzsche. Modernity was replaced by postmodernity, during which 
religion regained its vitality and strength compared to the classical 
modern era of the 18th and 19th century; previously confined to 
triggering “pure” religious movements, religion in postmodernity 
transcended the religious sphere and went on to inspire social and 
political movements also. 
During the 20th century, religion retired modernity, helping 
the epoch to enter the postmodernity era due to “material fatigue” 
of enlightenment values. What lead to the eventual rejection of 
these values was that the Enlightenment progress had throughout 
the World Wars, economic and political crises and violent revolu-
tion, showed its other, aggressive and dark side, to which Hegel di-
alectically indicated in his work “The History of Philosophy”.1 Addi-
tionally, Horkheimer and Adorno fully developed this theory in 
their text “Dialectic of Enlightenment”.2
The aim of this paper is to examine the shift from modernity 
to postmodern age and from materialist values of Enlightenment 
to postmodern post materialist values that gradually returned reli-
gion to the public sphere and restored its social significance. Al-
though enlightenment marches from the end of the 18th century 
presented an image which foretold the downfall of religion, the 
20th and 21st century revealed that religion in fact had never lost its 
importance.
The weakening and fading of the classical Enlightenment 
paradigm with its materialism and mechanism can be associated 
with one of the most significant structural changes of the post-
1   G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, Batoche Books, 2001.
2   M. Horkheimer, T. W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 2002.
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modern age when compared with the beginning of modernism and 
its zenith – the advent of post-materialistic values.
In the 19th century, Alexis de Tocqueville prophetically an-
nounced the fall of post materialist values due to materialisation of 
modern society. When describing the society of the United States, 
Tocqueville explained « why the Americans display more readiness 
and more taste for general ideas than their forefathers, the Eng-
lish, 'while noticing that' if the human mind were to attempt to ex-
amine and pass a judgment on all the individual cases before it, the 
immensity of detail would soon lead it astray and bewilder its dis-
cernment: in this strait, man has recourse to an imperfect but nec-
essary expedient, which at once assists and demonstrates his weak-
ness. Having superficially considered a certain number of objects, 
and remarked their resemblance, he assigns to them a common 
name, sets them apart, and proceeds onwards ».3 Tocqueville was 
undoubtedly correct because it wasn’t long before a spiritual reac-
tion to enlightening mechanistic materialism initiated. 
The first signs of weakening of post materialist values sur-
faced during the interwar period in the 20th century, when an irra-
tional shift appeared, contrasting the rationality of the enlighten-
ment model. Besides conventional religiosity, new spiritual and 
sometimes even occult cults began to form. For instance, National 
Socialists were frequently involved in the occult and paganism, 
while the renewal of conventional religiosity appeared in the Ger-
man Catholic centre and British conservatives, who in order to up-
grade its pragmatism, sought to strengthen the principles of Angli-
can Protestantism’s investigation of structuralism4 had a great 
impact on the return of religion, cults and mythical thought among 
intellectuals. His research concluded that myth is not primitive irra-
tionality (thought), as was thought during the modern era by Ba-
con. On the contrary, myth by its structure is not only identical to 
logos, but also mythic structures are logically even more precise 
than structures of modern “scientific” statements. Cassirer’s re-
search concludes that religions and myths present the coherent 
Weltanschauung which fulfils: firstly, people’s necessity to irration-
3   A. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, A Penn State Electronic Classics Se-
ries Publication, 2002, pp. 497-498. 
4   E. Cassirer, Language and Myth, Courier Corporation, 1946.
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ally believe and; secondly, their desire to interpret the world mean-
ingfully, i.e. satisfying their intellectual need. Consequently, reli-
gion and myths cannot be understood as simple mysticism, but as 
epistemological and practical orientation of an individual in order 
to provide meanings to their world. Hence, beliefs can navigate in 
practical orientation according to the individual. One step remains 
only from religion and myth as an individual’s a priori structure to 
true religiosity, which had once again placed the Truth into the area 
of transcendental. This step was easy to take after structuralistic 
re-legitimisation of religious and mythical opinion. 
Lyotard’s postmodern attitudes had a significant impact on 
the return to religion, especially his famous saying – « point out to 
the invisible ».5 Although Lyotard himself rejects religious implica-
tions of his opinion, i.e. his delegitimization of modernist rationali-
ty, it wouldn’t be wrong to assume that religion would spontane-
ously and coercively attempt to replace the shaken world of 
modernist meanings after previously mentioned postmodern dele-
gitimization. Thus, Lyotard, although indirectly, has influenced the 
return of religion in modern life. In a way, he succeeded in fulfilling 
his childhood dream of becoming a Dominican monk (according to 
his biographies) after he had he given it up to study philosophy.  
Nevertheless, as legacy of the 1968 student demonstrations 
and the hippie movement that antedated it, new cults and Eastern 
religions start to spread in the social life of Europe. Finally, the last 
phase of this spiritualization precipitated after the fall of the Berlin 
wall, in, until that moment, still materialistic and real-socialistic 
Eastern Europe, while suddenly conventional and traditional reli-
gions gain popularity as well as some new, alternative, religious 
forms. In light of these major events and changes, it can be de-
duced that this epoch, contrary to early modern Bacon’s and Car-
thusians rationalisation and technisation, was characterised by a 
search for new directions, which although might not have directly 
opposed the technical civilization existing at the time, questioned 
its significance and boundaries. 
The post-modern civil society in its prime, in the second half 
of the 20th century, became “the dissatisfied society”, according to 
5   J. F. Lyotard, Šta je postmoderna, KIZ Art Press, Beograd, 1995., pp. 24, 34.
ed
ited
 vo
lum
es
267
Ágnes Heller. Therefore, by analysing Heller’s stance, Vukasin Pav-
lovic pointed that « the separation from traditional behavioural 
norms and the establishment of universal values (that is, the wish 
of owning something transforms into the wish of owning itself; the 
wish of becoming famous for something transforms into the wish 
of becoming famous regardless of cause and at any cost etc.) has 
made needs in essence unsatisfiable, while an identity and an in-
tegrity of the personality have been in essence removed from an 
obtainable and particular frame of reference, and instead they are 
thrust into an endless orbit of universal integration in which the 
reaching of something does not lead to fulfilment, because what 
follows always is the emergence of a new desire (so-called consum-
er psychology is one of the most prominent examples of this meta-
morphosis) ».6
With the domination of consumerist mentality as one of the 
by-products of the modern democratic “emancipations”, the foun-
dation of civil society began to degenerate. After banishing social 
theology from the political sphere, which the democratic develop-
ment had spread among the entire society, people, states and civil 
society became disorientated. They tried to compensate for the ab-
sence with hedonistic indulgence in consumer hysteria that al-
lowed them to briefly overcome fear and insignificance. Regarding 
the crisis of political and philosophical modernism, Mihajlo Djuric 
wrote: « The modern movement is not reaching an aim by which it 
could be tranquilized and finalized. Newer and greater successes of 
modern production are revealing a frightening fact that the mod-
ern movement are futile in its core. Hence, where is no goal, there 
is no meaningful movement ».7
Contrary to this superficial consumerist “modernist” dissemi-
nation, during postmodernity, the main need became the necessity 
for uniting and identity which consumer society was unable to han-
dle. Herein precisely lies the cause of the re-popularisation of con-
ventional and alternative religions and cults as well as the phenom-
enon of new social movements which united around new “ultimate 
6   V. Pavlović, Emancipatorska energija društvenih pokreta, u zborniku Obno-
va utopijskih energija, Istraživačko-izdavački centar SSO Srbije, Beograd, 
1987., pp. 10/11. 
7   M. Đurić, Utopija izmene sveta, IDN, Beograd, 1979., p. 9. 
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purposes”, i.e. eschatological goals, such as the ecological project 
of environmental protection.8 Opportunely, consumer post-civil 
society that slowly formed after the Second World War, allowed 
space for the creation of various groups which in their self-organi-
zation could defend themselves from the identity crisis. The con-
cept of civil society was subjected to a variety of spiritual and reli-
gious upgrades, both conventional and alternative. In fact, 
Tocqueville considered that the stability of modern democratic and 
liberal society was impossible without these upgrades which 
should present the counterpoise of all possible individualistic-eco-
nomic deviations.9 Tocqueville’s voice remained in the back-
ground for a long time, and only after the Second World War cer-
tain aspects of Tocqueville’s “controlling” demands to the liberal 
democratic order were affirmed, and have become particularly im-
portant in our time, when the Bretton Woods model of liberal capi-
talism is experiencing a crisis, and we face a real torrent of “identi-
ty” populist movements across Europe and the world that form an 
open partnership with various new-old religious patterns.
Namely, since the period of the French Revolution, democra-
cy and civil society on the one hand, and conventional churches and 
religions on the other, positioned themselves as irreconcilable ene-
mies, that is, as two completely different orders. 10 But after the 
8   This statement also concludes V. Pavlovic by saying « in all of this lies at 
least partially the explanation to the re-emergence of many religious 
cults today, both in the West and in the East; secondly, why they are 
greater in number and type; thirdly, why groups and therapies for psy-
chical support are gaining popularity; and finally, the popularity of move-
ments for ethnical and national emancipation, racial equality and cultural 
autonomy ». V.Pavlović, Emancipatorska energija društvenih pokreta, in 
Obnova utopijskih energija, Istraživačko-izdavački centar SSO Srbije, Be-
ograd, 1987., pp. 10/11. V. Stanovčić additionally recognized an effort of 
the epoch, thus he points out that the optimism of industrial society re-
placed the pessimism of post-industrial society, which after the break of 
rationalism during the First World War, starting with the existential phi-
losophy, shift into the seeking of new meanings, which founds in the 
sphere of the irrational, by religion being a part of it. V. Stanovčić, 
Političke ideje i religija, Čigoja Štampa, Beograd, 1999, tom II, pp, 121. – 
124. 
9   A. Tokvil, O demokratiji u Americi, Izdavačka knjižarnica Zorana Stojano-
vića, Sremski Karlovci, CID, Podgorica, 199 0., pp. 252, 255, 492-499.
10   This demonstrates papal encyclicals Quanta cura and Syllabus written in 
1864 by Pope Pius IX by which he condemned liberalism and democracy 
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Second World War, a great reconciliation occurred between 
post-civil society and already mature democracy and conventional 
religious institutions that fit into post-civil order, which allowed 
them full autonomy in religious rituals, the autonomy of internal ju-
risdiction and provided them with security guarantees. Even the 
Catholic Church has accepted some of the French Revolution herit-
age, as can be seen from the encyclical of Pope John XXIII entitled 
Pacem in Terris (Peace on Earth) published on April 11, 1963. In this 
encyclical, not only the heritage of democratic-liberal development 
is recognized, but many contemporary problems are addressed, 
such as: the rights of workers, the humanization of the modern 
economy, human rights in general, the critique of colonialism and 
neo-colonialism, the determination for the increasing social en-
gagement of women, the commitment to nuclear disarmament, 
the concerns over global equality, etc.
The reason why the churches after the Second World War 
are reconciled with democracy and liberalism should become ap-
parent in the fact that during the whirlwind of war, the greatest 
danger to Christian understanding of freedom did not originate 
from that side, but from the side of national socialist paganism, 
that is, from the communist atheism. 11
An additional impulse for the attitude change, not only of 
Christian, but of all conventional religions according to modern 
trends, was the content of the Universal Declaration of human rights 
adopted by the United Nations in 1948, which departs from the rig-
id enlightenment of the Declaration of 1789, with similar content at 
first glance, while in essence, visible changes were made. Perhaps 
the most important change is the concession to monotheistic reli-
gions in the “metaphysical” and postulative defining of «inherent 
as opposite to the Catholic doctrine. However, in 19th century certain lib-
eral Catholics as Félicité Lamennais disputed these tendencies. 
11   After the Great Patriotic War, the Russian Orthodox Church turned again 
to the careful criticism of communism. Additionally, after the death of 
Stalin when a title of General Secretary of the communist party was giv-
en to persons, such as Khrushchev and Brezhnev, who did not own Sta-
lin’s “theological” feeling, criticism of communism became even more 
obvious. However, Communism was different than Nazism, which was 
characterized by anti-Christian ideas and paganism; hence in the Soviet 
Union where was established the communist society, the Church sur-
vived and preserved its infrastructure.
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dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of 
the human family»12, where its origin is no longer sought in the en-
lightenment theory of a social contract. Instead dignity is simply 
postulated without remarks on its origin. This greatly pleased 
churches and other religious organizations. With pure conscience, 
they could have found the origin of the above-mentioned human 
“dignity” in God. The possibility of latent “metaphysical” connota-
tions of the Universal Declaration was the reason for the represent-
atives of the Marxist countries to abstain during the final vote on it 
in the UN General Assembly. Noting on this occasion that this dec-
laration has no revolutionary implications, while it can serve the 
popularization of the “opium for the masses”, as orthodox Marxists 
referred to religion since their great founder.
In general, the reconciliation between the civil society and 
conventional religions after the Second World War was testified by 
a number of circumstances, from which we can conclude that the 
antagonisms cultivated at the time of the French Revolution be-
tween the enlightenment and conventional religious organizations 
were overcome. Now we have a blend of the principles contained 
in the Declaration of Human and Citizen Rights from year 1789, as a 
proclamation of a (liberal) revolution, with some of the Holy Alli-
ance principles as a kind of restoration declaration. This is evident, 
for example, in the following documents of Catholic councils, such 
as Gaudium et Spes and Dignitatis Humanae, which relate to the 
Pacem in Terris encyclical, which equally count on democracy, liber-
alism and human rights, but stating the necessity of recognizing 
the church and churches as a stable spiritual order that will be one 
of the global balance savers.13 However, it will not be disputed 
that within the churches, and especially within the Catholic, some 
circles remain hostile to democratic novelties, but churches make 
their voices heard only within ecclesiastical organizations in order 
to prevent possible attacks due to inflexible conservatism.
12   Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble:  https://www.ohchr.org/
EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf  -  Pointed out by N. C.
13   For encyclicals Gaudium et Spes and Dignitatis humanae, and their contri-
butions to the modern and “democratic” Catholicism, see: Osnove socijal-
nog učenja katoličke crkve, Fondacija Konrad Adenauer i Beogradska nad-
biskupija, Beograd, 2006., pp. 6, 36, 66, 78, 80, 89, 104, 155, 164, 216, 
220-222 
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Churches and other religious organizations in Europe after 
the Second World War generally accept democracy and some of the 
civil society segments, representing in that way one of the ethical 
controllers of any possible political self-will, while not being its 
sources any longer – such as in Tocqueville’s or, even more, in de 
Mestre’s time. The more balanced relations between religious or-
ganizations and civil society14 testify to the new signs of the epoch 
brought by postmodern time, and the visible contours of the so-
called post materialistic values. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
some very interesting sociological researches show that voters in 
contemporary Western democracies are being less polarized ac-
cording to social class and classical ideologies, and increasingly ac-
cording to principle - for or against materialist, that is, post-material-
ist values.15 This further suggests that old ideological divisions have 
been overcome, and new differences and value orientations are be-
ing introduced into the political field. This will have consequences 
when it comes to the more noticeable disappearance of the classi-
cal division of the political field into left and right, in their currently 
recognizable ideological forms. We have its full expression today, 
when the populist movements of our time, while fighting against 
liberal democracy, blend the left and right-wing segments. 16  
14   The question whether the Church and religious organizations are parts 
of civil society is topic too broad to discuss it now. Therefore, according 
to Pantic, it can only be concluded that a post-modern religiosity is not 
always an obstacle to civil society. Pantic also stated that the relation-
ship between civil society and religiosity is ambiguous, hence occasional-
ly religiosity became an ally of civil society and sometimes even its oppo-
nent.  Dragomir J. Pantić, Dominantne vrednosne orijentacije u Srbiji i mo-
gućnosti nastanka civilnog društva, u zborniku Potisnuto civilno društvo ur. 
V.Pavlović, EKO CENTAR, Beograd, 1995, pp. 84.-87. Additionally, it’s 
worth mentioning that, according to V. Pavlovic « it is difficult to refute 
the fact that the church does not represent civil society (especially in the 
development sphere of ethical principles which presents the base of civil 
society) », Ibid., p. 249. 
15   R. Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society, Princeton Univer-
sity Press, Princeton – New Jersey, 1990., pp. 280-286.  
16   For the announcement of the time that commence “on the other side of 
left and right-wing” by mixing its narratives and the official confirmation 
of this announcement, see:  Neven Cvetićanin, Epoha s one strane levice i 
desnice, Službeni Glasnik-Institut društvenih nauka, Beograd, 2008, 
Neven Cvetićanin, Državništvo modernog doba, Arhipelag-Institut društ-
venih nauka, Beograd, 2016.  
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The focus is on entering the era of a new post-modern 
(post-industrial, post-civil) “enchantment17” that will be contrary to 
the Weberian modernistic “un enchantment” (Entzauberung)18, 
which represents the general place of modernist vocabulary, the 
initial capsule and the inner core of modernist development. As op-
posed to that, we will have a postmodern (post-industrial, post-civ-
il) world that will no longer be strictly rational, and which will not 
be subject only to rational interpretations. Rationality here will 
constitute only one of the offered legitimate choices, while all irra-
tionalities will also receive new-old legitimacy, introducing the 
strengthening of different religious fundamentalisms, that are al-
ready growing stronger, not only at some remote points of the 
world, but in Europe itself.
Apart from social movements, such an atmosphere is also 
the result of some studies of so-called positive and natural scienc-
es, which are not able to indirectly reflect on the social movements 
themselves. Unlike the beginnings of modern science where “peo-
ple are giving up of meaning”19 inaugurating bare scientific positiv-
ism, at the beginning of the postmodern era, in the era between 
the world wars and, especially after the Second World War, sense 
has been re-returned to science. But its sense was not restored by 
fitting it within the frames of some dogmatic metaphysics, as was 
the case in the pre-modern era, but by restating again the question 
of its meaning, which was long absent, and to which, now in the 
postmodern era, multiple answers are possible.
Lyotard raises this question and offers a multifaceted an-
swer to it, and thus  re-introduces the question of the body of sci-
entific research ‘through the back door’, even though he refuses to 
accept that body in a logocentric manner like traditional metaphys-
ics.20 If Lyotard is correct, to use one of Jaspers expressions -  “the 
17   For this aspect of so-called post-modern era, see: Françoise Gaillard, 
Novo začaravanje sveta, in: Postmoderna – nova epoha ili zabluda, Naprijed, 
Zagreb, 1988, pp. 119–134. 
18   M. Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, Tübingen, 
1920/21.
19   M. Horkheimer, T. Adorno, Dijalektika prosvetiteljstva, Veselin Masleša, 
Sarajevo, 1989., p. 19.
20   J. F. Lyotard, Šta je postmoderna, KIZ Art Press, Beograd, 1995., pp. 61. – 64. 
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spiritual situation of time21” - that is, the spiritual situation of mod-
ern science that is desperately seeking for a body, then the new 
concrete reality of science will in practice be embodied into two 
new contemporary scientific paradigms - general theory of relativi-
ty and quantum mechanics.
Namely, the general theory of relativity and quantum me-
chanics will not be represented as metaphysics in the traditional 
meaning of the word, but both of these scientific paradigms will 
imply some metaphysical conclusions that surpass simplistic scien-
tific positivism. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that quantum mechanics are 
often used by theists of all confessions, while the general relativity 
theory is used by certain neo-Spinosists. All this unambiguously 
states that the epoch shows signs of overcoming the narrow optics 
of modern mechanistic positivism22, replacing it with what we can 
call “partial metaphysics”.23 The philosophic equivalent to the 
physics of quantum mechanics is Jean Baudrillard, with his Fatal 
Strategies24 in which the modernistic, omniscient, tireless and 
mechanistically-pragmatic Odyssey is replaced by a post-modern 
Odyssey, who is amazed by the new-old secrets of the once again 
“enchanted” world.25
21   K. Jaspers, Duhovna situacija vremena, Književna zajednica Novog Sada, 1987. 
22   If there is no significant antagonism between “general relativity” and 
Newton’s “classical mechanics”, GR is not denying it, but improving it. 
Therefore, “quantum mechanics” is changing its basic principles of inves-
tigation while switching the rationalistic relation of cause and conse-
quence to half-metaphysical entities such as “quark” or “antimatter”- 
which are allowing for the possibility of category of probabilities, that is 
coincidences. The difference between classical and quantum mechanics 
are indicated in the same manner as the distinction between modern 
and post-modern age, although belonging to the same epoch. Since re-
searchers of “quantum mechanics” exceeded, but not abolished the prin-
ciples of classical mechanics, they are, therefore, as well as researchers 
of “classical mechanics”, offspring of the same period and the same flow 
thinking.   
23   What we have named the “partial metaphysics”, Lyotard called the “mi-
crology”. Jean François Lyotard, Šta je postmoderna, KIZ Art Press, Be-
ograd, 1995., p. 64. 
24   J. Baudrillard, Fatal Strategies, Pluto Press, 1999.
25   Gaillard points out that Baudrillard in the aforementioned work « is sug-
gesting a reverse Odyssey, this time in the opposite direction; however, 
she is not inviting us to repeat the journey of Odysseus, but to free the 
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This world of “new enchantment” is not only the world of 
the return of old religious and literary myths, but also new media 
or virtual myths are possible, which also produce irrational behav-
iour, but, unlike those old myths, represent the real “implosion of 
meaning”, as expressed by Baudrillard. 26
The postmodern era thus, with its post-materialist values and 
the accompanying return of religion and religiousness as a relevant 
social force, offers its paradise, as well as its hell, but will, however, 
leave people the choice of which side to choose.
path, to unwind the destiny of mankind which has been integrated into 
delicate threads of the mind ». Gaillard by analysing Baudrillard are pre-
cising the sin of prudent Odysseus because of which « the shifty decep-
tions, invented in order to resist the enchanting voices of the world full 
of meaning, stayed tied up to the mast of the mind, so we do not, se-
duced by fear, cross over to the side of the mermaids ». Françoise Gail-
lard, Novo začaravanje sveta, in: Postmoderna – nova epoha ili zabluda, 
Naprijed, Zagreb, 1988., pp. 132-133. 
26   Ž. Bodrijar, Simulakrumi i simulacija, Svetovi, Novi Sad, 1991, pp. 83–90.
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